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Country Comfort:
Vice and Corruption in Rural Settings
by
Gary W. Potter
and
Larry K. Gaines
ABSTRACT
This article provides an in-depth examination of rural
organized crime. Organized crime studies traditionally
have focused on urban criminality; this study discusses
its rural form. Types of participants, patterns of crimi-
nality, and relationships with political and law enforce-
ment corruption are detailed. Although there are differ-
ences between urban and rural organized crime, it tends
to exhibit some similarities regardless of setting.
Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice
Vol. 8  No. 1  February 1992
Introduction
It is virtually axiomatic in the organized crime literature that the
continual delivery of illicit goods and services by organized crime groups
could not continue without some level of accommodation and cooperation
from government officials and police. Studies, such as Chambliss’ (1978)
description of organized crime in Seattle and Gardiner’s (1970) inquiry into
organized crime and corruption in &dquo;Wincanton,&dquo; among others, have
stressed the symbiotic relationship between official power and organized
crime (see also, Gardiner and Lyman, 1978; Lupsha, 1987; Chambliss,
1986; Naylor, 1987; Lemoux, 1984). Furthermore, the national war on
drugs has resulted in a series of revelations which have identified
widespread corruption at all levels of law enforcement and government in
general.
There is a distinct urban bias in the study of corruption and crime.
Scholarly studies and major criminal justice agency inquiries into the
delivery of illicit goods and services are exclusively focused on urban
settings. This reflects, no doubt, the spatial concentration of such illicit
activity in major urban settings and the tendency of investigative bodies to
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focus on urban areas. In addition, the largest police departments are
obviously urban and tend to draw the greatest attention in the criminal
justice literature.
This concentration of attention on urban areas has tended to obscure an
important truth in both the study of corruption and the study of organized
crime. The truth is that rural areas have drug dealers, bootleggers,
prostitutes, gamblers, loansharks, auto thieves, fences, and the like. These
criminals provide illicit goods and services on a continual basis and in order
to do so, they have reached some kind of accommodation with the social
control bureaucracy. While this activity in rural settings has not received
the same level of attention as its urban counterpart, it is nonetheless quite
real and is becoming more public. For example, literally dozens of sheriffs
in rural counties of Tennessee and Georgia have been charged with
involvement in drug trafficking (Shenon, 1988). In 1989, the sheriff of
Henry County Georgia was sentenced to thirty-five years in prison for his
assistance to drug smugglers. In Dawson County Georgia the sheriff was
sentenced to thirty years for providing protection to drug smugglers
(Coppola, 1989). The sheriff of Morgan County Kentucky along with the
county judge and several local businessmen were convicted on charges of
protecting drug dealers and cocaine distribution in 1988 CLicking Valley
Courier. 1989). In 1982, Sheriff Paul L. Browning, Jr. of Harlan County
Kentucky was convicted of plotting the murder of two political enemies
(Estep, 1991.) And in August, 1991, the sheriffs of Wolfe County, Lee
County, and Owsley County, all in Kentucky, along with a deputy sheriff
and a police chief were convicted of bribery, extortion and conspiracy to
distribute cocaine and marijuana (Estep and Poore,1991). The fact is that
corruption is as critical a determinant of rural law enforcement and politics
as it is to social control in our big cities. The purpose of this study is to
describe the types and modes of corruption in rural settings and to explore
the relationship between organizations providing illicit goods and services
in rural settings and public officials.
Stereotypes of Rural Organized Crime
Rural organized crime, when discussed at all, is usually presented in
terms of disorganized bands of fences, con-men, strip-joint owners, and
auto thieves. Occasionally reference is made to the &dquo;Dixie Mafia&dquo; as a
typical rural organized crime group (Hunter,1983; St. George,1991). This
group is described as &dquo;a confederation of crooks who helped each other
steal, murder and swindle in towns and cities across the South&dquo; (St. George,
1991 ). A member of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement is quoted
as saying of the Dixie Mafia, &dquo;they remind me of Jesse James, cowboys
riding up and down the roads looking for someone to steal from or kill&dquo; (St.
George, 1991).
 at EASTERN KENTUCKY UNIV on March 24, 2011ccj.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
38
So, while their urban brethren are depicted as suave, highly organized,
intelligent and cunning illicit businessmen in silk suits and shoes of fine
Italian leather, rural organized criminals are presented as beer-guzzling
rednecks, moving to and fro from stockcar races to strip-joints, stealing
cars, swindling widows, and murdering innocent victims oreach other. The
paucity of research on rural organized makes it impossible to evaluate the
utility of this view of the rural organized criminals.
This study explores criminal enterprises operating in an area of rural
eastern Kentucky. The research documents the prevalence of organized
criminal activity in the area, the shape of illicit markets, the means of
coordination and management used by criminal entrepreneurs, and rela-
tions between criminal syndicates and political and law enforcement
officials. For purposes of this study, organized crime is defined as the
&dquo;management and coordination of illegal enterprises connected with vice
(gambling, prostitution, high-interest loans, pornography, and drug traf-
ficking), and racketeering (labor and business extortion)&dquo; (Block and
Chambliss, 1981). This definition is appropriate since it both delineates
the market in which organized crime groups operate and recognizes
management and coordination concepts as important for criminal organi-
zation.
Methodology
The data for this study were gathered in a relatively simple manner. In
order to make the area covered by our study manageable, one economic
development area in eastern Kentucky was selected for study. Kentucky
has designated fifteen economic development areas, five of which fall
within the Appalachian region of eastern Kentucky (Department of
Economic Development, 1986). Economic development regions contain
counties which are similar in demographic characteristics and are proximitous
to one another. The development area chosen for this study contains five
counties, all rural, all lightly populated, and all with significant economic
problems. For purposes of this study, these counties are designated as
&dquo;Clapper,&dquo; &dquo;Loam,&dquo; &dquo;Mountain,&dquo; &dquo;Valley,&dquo; and &dquo;Coal&dquo; counties. The five
counties cover slightly more that 3,200 square miles and have a population
slightly in excess of 231,000 people. Per capita income in the area is about
$6,800, and the official unemployment rate is 10.7%, although the real
unemployment rate as calculated by University of Kentucky economists is
around 33.8%. In addition, to being similar in demographics these counties
are also similar in geography, with rugged, mountainous terrain predomi-
nating. The major industries, all of which are in decline, are coal mining,
timber, and agriculture.
After selecting the site for the study, data were gathered in the following
manner. Local newspapers which serve the five counties were searched
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over a twenty-four month period for all stories dealing with illicit activities
involving the goods and services traditionally associated with organized
crime (i.e., drug trafficking, gambling, prostitution, organized auto theft,
organized fencing of stolen property, and bootlegging). In addition, pub-
lished reports from the Kentucky Justice Cabinet and U.S. Attorney’s office
in Lexington, Kentucky, were searched for similar information (Drug
Enforcement Strategy Committee, 1987; Kentucky Justice Cabinet, 1988;
DeFalaise and Whittle, 1989). Specific criminal actions noted in these
newspapers, such as indictments and convictions, were recorded to create
a database of organized crime networks involved in the provision of illicit
and goods and services in the counties under study for the period 1988-
1990. Those enterprises identified in at least two sources and having at least
five individuals in positions of management and coordination (a rather
arbitrary number selected to differentiate between organized crime groups
and simple partnerships or individual entrepreneurs) were selected and
designated as rural organized crime networks. In total eighty-eight rural
organized crime networks were identified. Those eighty-eight crime
networks were then reduced to a database of twenty-eight crime networks
through additional observational research.
Following the accumulation of documentary information, a field re-
search design was initiated in order to become acquainted with the methods
and means of illicit entrepreneurship in the counties under study. Using a
participant-as-observer role (Gold, 1958) in which the researchers posed
as customers, observations were conducted at roadhouses, game rooms,
restaurants, food stores, gas stations, truck stops, and illegal retail liquor
outlets. In the course of these observations primary informant relationships
were developed with sixteen participants in the rural organized crime
networks under study. Data was recorded foreach rural criminal enterprise
observed and observational notes were recorded immediately following
observations.
Following the accumulation of observational data, specific validity and
reliability tests were undertaken. The observational notes were checked for
contaminating influences using McCall’s data quality index (McCall,
1968: 120-125). Contaminated and incomplete data were excluded from
the database, and only instances in which complete information on a
specific crime network had been obtained were included in the final
database. Analysis of the data was undertaken using both Glazer’s (1965:
44) constant comparative method and Becker’s (1961: 43) tabular model
for hypothesis evaluation.
Twenty-eight rural organized crime networks were identified for the
five counties under study. Complete observational, informant, and docu-
mentary data had to be present to be included in the database. Those crime
networks for which complete records could not be accumulated were
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excluded. These twenty-eight rural crime networks became a criminal
enterprise data for the five counties. The data was then analyzed for specific
network characteristics including number of enterprise participants in
management and coordination positions, gender of participants, extended
family relationships among those participants, types of criminal activity
engaged in as primary income generators by the crime network, number of
criminal enterprises engaged in as primary income generators by the crime
network, the existence of corrupt relations with public officials and the
mode of these corrupt relations, and legitimate businesses utilized by the
crime network in the conduct of their illicit activities.
The Rural Market Illicit Goods and Services
Criminal enterprises engaged in as primary income generators by rural
organized crime groups in eastern Kentucky can be divided into two major
categories: (1) wholesale production and supply, and (2) retail sales and
service. The most profitable aspect of the rural crime industry is in the
wholesale trade. This includes the growing and processing of high-grade
marijuana crops, and the transshipment of cocaine from its point of
embarkation, through eastern Kentucky, to some ultimate sales destination.
The retail crime industry revolves around the provision of illicit goods and
services to residents of eastern Kentucky and to transient customers passing
through the area, and includes the illegal sale of liquor, drugs, prostitution
services, and gambling services.
While there is no systematic and reliable estimate available from any
official source, there is widespread intersubjective agreement among both
law enforcers and criminal activists that the marijuana industry is the
cornerstone of eastern Kentucky’s agricultural economy. Local law
enforcement officers have estimated that as many of 40% of the residents
in the area under study are employed in the marijuana industry (Kelley,
1989). It is easy to understand the attractiveness of marijuana cultivation.
First, and most importantly, marijuana is a highly profitable crop. Local
growers estimate that two high-grade marijuana plants will yield as great
a return as an entire burley tobacco crop for the average farmer. Second,
marijuana is a crop uniquely conducive to the topology and farming
conditions in the mountainous areas of eastern Kentucky. Most marijuana
is planted in small plots of about 60 square feet. These marijuana gardens,
if properly tended, will yield about $60,000 worth of high-grade marijuana.
The marijuana cultivation industry works very much like a truck
farmers’ cooperative. Buyers oftentimes contract in advance with growers
and simply pick up the marijuana after harvesting or processing. Alterna-
tively, some buyers come into eastern Kentucky during the three marijuana
harvests, visit growers, evaluate their product, and bid for it in much the
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same manner as the major tobacco companies bid for the burley crop.
Kentucky State Police intelligence indicate that local marijuana is now
commonly shipped to at least 15 states outside of Kentucky for sale (Drug
Enforcement Strategy Committee, 1987; Kentucky Justice Cabinet, 1988).
Marijuana, however, is not the sole wholesale drug business in eastern
Kentucky. In the past few years the transshipment of cocaine has also
become big business. As cocaine importing has become logistically more
complex in order to avoid law enforcement interdiction, and as the
quantities of cocaine entering the U.S. have reached prodigious proportions
in the last five years, moving the drug has become a sizable cottage industry
in eastern Kentucky (DeFalaise and Whittle, 1989; Drug Enforcement
Strategy Committee, 1987; Kentucky Justice Cabinet, 1988; National
Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee, 1986-86). Most transship-
ment operations are relatively simple. A load of cocaine is brought into
remote, abandoned, or temporary landing strips scattered throughout the
eastern Kentucky mountains from initial embarkation points in Florida,
Alabama, Louisiana and Texas. The cocaine is then off-loaded and shipped
by car or pickup truck to destinations such as Chicago, Cincinnati,
Indianapolis, Pittsburgh, and Cleveland. While the police are busy
stopping Porsches with Florida license plates and hispanic or black drivers,
large amounts of cocaine are being moved by good-ole’ country boys far
from the prying eyes of law enforcement.
Rural organized crime’s retail market is centered on the same basic
human vices as their urban cousins: liquor, sex, and gambling.
Kentucky, for reasons known only to local sheriffs, bootleggers, and
Baptist preachers, maintains a local option with regard to alcohol. All of
the counties in our study have exercised their option to keep the counties
legally &dquo;dry.&dquo; In fact, these counties sit in the middle of &dquo;dry belt&dquo; that
extends an hour’s drive down the interstate to the south and an hour and
half’s drive up the interstate to the north. As a directresult the procurement,
smuggling and sale of &dquo;white liquor&dquo; is a big illicit business.
Organized crime’s retail liquor trade takes place in two formats. Some
organized crime groups have established chains of illegal liquor stores
throughout rural areas of eastern Kentucky. Most often these are private
residences, country stores, or gas stations in which liquor is always
available. The crime networks buy liquor in large quantities from legal
retailers in wet areas at pre-arranged discount prices. It is then transported
to the &dquo;dry&dquo; counties and sold at an immense markup, usually between 33 %
and 50%. The other venue in which illegal liquor is made available by
organized crime groups is through a series of roadhouses and jenny barns.
Jenny barns are small establishments, once again usually located in a
private residence, in which liquor is sold by the drink. Ancillary services,
such as prostitution and limited gambling services, are also usually pro-
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vided. Rural organized crime networks may operate as many as two dozen
jenny barns on their turf. Roadhouses, on the other hand, tend to be larger
establishments, with a few rivaling the small nightclubs of the &dquo;wet&dquo; cities.
Roadhouses are often converted barns, warehouses, or old farmhouses.
They feature a full-service bar, often a live band, dancing, &dquo;strippers,&dquo;
casino type games of chance (blackjack, craps, slot machines, poker
machines), and usually a stable of prostitutes.
Much like the liquor trade, illegal gambling occurs in several formats
in the eastern Kentucky counties. Most commonly, rural organized crime
networks place illegal machines in businesses where a tourist, trucker, or
other transient might stop. The second most common venue is the &dquo;game
room,&dquo; an establishment which features legal entertainment, such as pinball
machines and pool tables, but which will also offer gambling devices, small
scale bookmaking and small stakes table games. At the roadhouses,
gambling services also involve illegal machines and table games.
Prostitution is surprisingly easy to find in these five rural counties.
Organized crime groups place women in truck stops, restaurants, and other
establishments serving tourists and truckers on the interstate; local
&dquo;tanning salons,&dquo; which are the rural version of the urban massage parlor;
and, of course, the jenny barns and roadhouses. The interstate trade is the
least sophisticated of the prostitution services, the rough rural equivalent
of urban streetwalkers. The &dquo;tanning salon&dquo; trade, however, is better
organized. Customers come to the establishment and pay for a tanning
session during which they are assisted by a female employee. During the
session a massage might be suggested by the attendant or the customer
might inquire about other sexual services. Prices in these establishments
range from $40 to $120 depending on the service requested. The prostitu-
tion services in roadhouses and jenny barns are quite variable. In the small
jenny bams the service is crude with little attention to preliminaries or
ambience. In the larger roadhouses, however, prostitutes receive a
commission for the number of drinks they sell to the customer (much like
the traditional b-girl). They socialize with the customer, dance with him,
and engage in conversation. When that conversation turns to sexual
services the exchange is discreet and usually occurs either in a private room
made available for such liasons or in a trailer out back.
Rural Organized Crime and Modes of Official Corruption
Twenty-five of the twenty-eight crime networks operating in the five
rural counties of eastern Kentucky under study make use of some form of
corrupt relationships with public officials and law enforcement officers in
the conduct of their illicit business.
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How corrupt relationships actually occur and how they are utilized in
the delivery of illicit goods and services depends largely on the mode of
corruption. In the police literature various typologies have been created to
identify modes of corruption. The Knapp Commission (Knapp Commis-
sion,1973: 1-34) classified corrupt police officers as either &dquo;meat eaters&dquo;
or &dquo;grass eaters.&dquo; &dquo;Meat eaters&dquo; were those officers who actively misused
their police powers by seeking opportunities for bribes or actively partici-
pating in criminal endeavors, while &dquo;grass eaters&dquo; were those officers who
merely accepted that graft that came their way. Michael Johnston (1982:
75) categorized corruption in four ways: (1) internal corruption, (2)
selective enforcement or nonenforcement, (3) active criminality, and (4)
bribery and extortion.
Groups involved in the delivery of illicit goods and services can make
use of a wide range of corrupt contacts to insure the uninterrupted delivery
of their products. Corrupt law enforcement officers can overlook illegal
activity, &dquo;lose&dquo; evidence, give inadequate testimony, or make improper
arrests. Corrupt judges can dismiss cases or steer the course of trials in favor
of the defendants. Corrupt prosecutors can choose not to prosecute certain
cases.
In eastern Kentucky’s rural counties, making these corrupt contacts is
far easier than in urban settings. First of all, government is considerably
less complex than in a major city (Ireland, 1977; Lee, 1981). County
government is supervised by a &dquo;Judge Executive&dquo; who acts as the chief
administrative officer of the county. Law enforcement usually involves the
county sheriff and his deputies and a very small number of local police
officers if there is a city located in the county. There is one county attorney
and usually only one or two judicial officers serving the county. Unlike
New York or Philadelphia with hundreds of judges, thousands of police
officers, dozens of district attorneys and assistant district attorneys and
thousands of municipal officials, rural organized crime groups require only
minimal contacts to guarantee protection of their illicit activities. For this
study a typology was created of the modes of corruption occurring in rural
settings. This typology identifies four primary modes of corruption: (1)
official acquiescence; (2) familial relations; (3) bribery and extortion, and
(4) active participation in organized criminal ventures.
Official Acquiescence: Official acquiescence occurs when law en-
forcement officers and political figures in the county know of the activities
of criminal organizations and choose not to intervene. It is, in essence a
policy of nonenforcement or selective enforcement of the law. Of the
criminal networks surveyed for this study eleven of the twenty-eight
networks were the beneficiaries of official acquiescence. In this mode of
corruption no bribes are exchanged nor do public officials personally profit
from the activities of criminal networks. Official acquiescence merely
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represents a decision by officials not to intervene in criminal activity, a
decision to not enforce the law.
Table 1:
Modes of Corruption Utilized by
Rural Organized Crime Networks
Familial Relations: A second mode of corruption revolves around the
existence of familial relations. In studies of organized crime networks
operating in rural settings it has been found that one of the principle
organizing criteria for these groups is the recruitment of relatives (either
through blood or marriage) to the criminal group (Potter and Gaines, 1990).
Of the twenty-eight groups surveyed for this study, sixteen had individuals
related to one another in management and coordination roles. In Kentucky’s
rural counties the strength of the extended family is well recognized in all
aspects of community life. It is therefore not at all surprising that the family
should play a major role in the organization of criminal activity and
corruption. Five of the twenty-eight criminal networks studied had
relatives among county office-holders and law enforcement officials in
their counties of operation. Familial relations as a mode of corruption, once
again, entails a form of selective enforcement or nonenforcement. That
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nonenforcement policy is simply strengthened by the existence of familial
ties.
Bribery and Extortion : When we think of corruption we usually think
of public officials and law enforcement officers who take bribes from
criminal actors to either ignore their criminal activities or to somehow
protect those activities. While corruption is often far more subtle than crass
bribery, bribery is nonetheless present among rural organized crime
networks, with four of the crime networks surveyed directly bribing law
enforcement officials in return for crime-committing licenses.
Active Participation: Finally, there are instances in which political
office-holders and law enforcement officials are active participants in
organized crime networks. William Chambliss (1978) has suggested that
the strongest and best organized crime groups are actually cabals in which
public officials and businessmen play a major coordinating role and
criminals are more or less employees or managers of the organized crime
enterprises. Certainly having a law enforcement officer or a political figure
as an active participant in the crime group, particularly a rural crime
network where a single official can have an enormous impact, offers a wide
range of opportunities to criminal entrepreneurs. Five of the crime networks
operating in the area covered by this study have office-holders or law
enforcement officials as active participants in the network.
Participant Characteristics and Official Corruption
In looking at the characteristics of the participants in these organized
crime networks, several factors stand out as impacting on both the incidence
and modalities of corrupt relations in the organizing of crime. The first of
these is the gender of those involved in managing and coordinating rural
organized crime activities.
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Table 2:
Relationships Between the Number of Females
in Management and Coordination Positions in Rural Cime
Networks and the Use of Official Corruption by that Network
The vast majority (82.14%) of rural organized crime networks in this
study had females in positions of management and coordination within the
network. The number of females in such positions ranged from a low of
one to a high of five, with a mean of 1.89 females per network.
Rural crime networks making use of official corruption have signifi-
cantly fewer females in management and coordination positions that do not
make use of official corruption. There may be several reasons for this
relationship. First, the appearance of females in leadership roles in
organized crime is a peculiarly rural phenomenon (Potter and Gaines,
1990). The prevailing assumption about organized crime in general is that
it is a male dominated social entity. The intensified role of females in rural
crime networks appears to derive from the role of women in rural society
in general and in the life of eastern Kentucky, in particular (Weller,1965).
In rural, agricultural communities women have traditionally played an
important role in the running and management of farms, taking responsi-
bility not just for crop production, but also for many of the commercial
transactions and activities attendant to farming. In addition, the rural
extended family in eastern Kentucky has traditionally reserved a strong
leadership for women. While certainly not a matriarchy, these families
have deferred considerable decision-making authority to mothers and
grandmothers, both in terms of family discipline and organization and in
terms of the family business. It is therefore not surprising to find women
carrying these responsibilities beyond the maintenance functions of the
family into the world of crime. In terms of criminal organization this implies
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that women bring with them to leadership roles considerable expertise,
authority, and family-based power. We can at least speculate that organi-
zations with females in leadership roles may have a higher degree of
internal discipline, better day-to-day coordination of activities, and a
tighter, better defined structure than other crime networks, therefore
obviating some of the need for corrupt relationships to protect the activities
of the network.
Most rural organized crime networks in this study have participants in
management positions who are related to each other (57.14%). On average
1.82 network managers are related.
Table 3:
Relationships Between the Number of Individuals Related
by Blood or Marriage in Management Positions in Rural Crime
Networks and the Modes of Corruption Used by that Network
It is apparent that rural crime networks with fewer related individuals
in management and coordination positions, make more use of opportunities
for official corruption than those with larger numbers of related individuals 
in management. Organizing crime with the assistance of relatives is a
common phenomenon in rural areas. To a large degree the family takes the
place of affiliatory groups identified in sociological studies of urban
organized crime, groups such as street gangs, prison acquaintances, and the
like (see, for example, Abadinsky, 1981: 30-32; Cloward and Ohlin, 1960;
Cohen, 1965; Miller, 1958; Shaw and McKay, 1972; Sutherland, 1973;
Suttles, 1968). The extended family in eastern Kentucky is the major social
institution in the community (Weller, 1965: 58). Families collaborate
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regularly, stay in close contact, recreate, work, and organize their lives
together. Because all organized crime groups face as their greatest problem
recruiting individuals who are trustworthy, loyal and committed to the
continuation of the enterprise, it is not surprising that the extended family
becomes one of the principle areas of recruitment for such groups in rural
settings. What this means in terms of corruption is that criminal organiza-
tions with a large number of related individuals in management and
coordination positions exhibit tighter organization, better security, and a
stronger defense against defections or infiltrations than other groups. This
tighter structure obviates the need for corrupt relationships as a means of
protection from official interference.
As pointed out above, networks which have achieved a high degree of
integration because of organization predicated on familial relationships
tend to have less use for official corruption than other networks. Also, it
appears that networks with higher numbers of related individuals are more
likely to rely either on nonenforcement by officials, or corrupt relation-
ships because they are related to public officials.
Organizational Characteristics and Official Corruption
In addition to influences emanating from the characteristics of partici-
pants in rural crime networks, the probability that such a crime network will l
make use of corrupt relationships with public officials and the form those
relationships take is affected by several organizational considerations,
including the number of criminal enterprises the network is engaged in as
a primary income generator; the specific type of enterprises which are
engaged in by the crime network; and the number of legitimate businesses
utilized by the crime network in its criminal operations.
The majority of rural organized crime networks engage in multiple
criminal enterprises as primary income generators with the average number
of criminal enterprises engaged in being 2.25.
The more criminal enterprises a crime network engages in as a primary
income generator for the network, the more likely it is that the crime
network will make use of corrupt relationships. There are two good reasons
for this. First of all, the more illicit businesses a crime network engages
in the more likely it is that its activities will come to the attention of law
enforcement. Therefore, the more active a crime network is, the greater
is the need for official protection of its activities.
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Table 4:
Relationships Between the Number of Criminal Enterprises
Engaged in by Rural Crime Networks as Primary Income
Generators and the Modes of Corruption Used by that Network
Second, the nature of multiple enterprise crime networks impacts on the
likelihood that the network will make use of official corruption. Bootleg-
ging enterprises, for example, often operate ancillary businesses in
gambling and prostitution. Therefore, the nature of the illicit business
spawns additional enterprises. As we shall see below, bootlegging,
gambling and prostitution invariably occurs within the context of corrupt
relations with government officials. On the other hand, drug networks are
far less likely to engage in multiple enterprises. While it is true that drug
networks may occasionally add weapons sales to their portfolio, and while
it is true that some bootleggers, particularly those operating roadhouses and
jenny barns may also provide customers access to marijuana and cocaine,
it is equally true that drug trafficking can exist on its own without ancillary
enterprises, and particularly in the case of marijuana cultivation and
processing, this is likely to be the case. Because drug networks have a
smaller incidence of the use of official corruption, and fewer ancillary
enterprises, they reinforce the idea that the fewer the criminal enterprises,
the less likely the existence of corrupt relationships.
In addition to affecting the incidence of corrupt relationships, there is
a clear relationship between the number of criminal enterprises and the
modes of corruption used. Those networks engaged in the fewest number
of criminal enterprises either have no corrupt relationships with public
officials or rely on official tolerance. Those networks engaged in the
highest number of criminal activities, tend to rely on familial relations with
officials, outright bribery, or the creation of crime cabals which include
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office-holders in the management and coordination of the crime network.
This is the result of a two-edged sword of corruption. First, as detailed
above, networks with multiple criminal enterprises, particularly those
which have combined bootlegging, gambling and prostitution, have a
greater need for official protection and therefore must seek stronger bonds
with public officials. On the other hand, this relationship also reflects the
fact that crime networks which are operating with secure bonds of corrup-
tion in place may feel that they can safely expand their criminal enterprises
because the necessary protection is already in place.
The type of criminal enterprise engaged by a rural crime network also
affects the probability that the network will be involved in official
corruption. Far and away the most common criminal enterprise engaged
in by rural crime networks in eastern Kentucky is drug trafficking,
particularly marijuana cultivation and the transshipmentof cocaine (Gaines,
Potter, and Falkenberg, 1990; Kentucky Justice Cabinet, 1988). Second in
incidence is weapons sales, a trade closely related to drug trafficking.
Gambling, bootlegging, and prostitution, representing the basic human
vices are engaged in by about one-third of the networks, with fencing and
auto theft, often thought of as being intimately connected to rural criminal
organizations, being the least frequent.
The type of criminal enterprise engaged in by a rural cnme network
plays a key role in explaining the probability that the network will make
use of official corruption as part of its ongoing business. While it is
important to note that all types of criminal activity make use of official
corruption more times than not, it is equally important to note that
gambling, prostitution and bootlegging invariably, and without exception,
make use of official corruption. There are several obvious reasons for this
relationship.
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Table 5:
Relationships Between the Types of Criminal Enterprise
Engaged in by Rural Crime Networks and the
Modes of Corruption Used by that Network
First of all, bootleggers, gamblers, and purveyors of prostitution operate
from fixed locations, on a predictable schedule. These are volume
businesses, requiring a large number of customers to insure profitability.
They therefore operate much like any retail business. They have an
established location (so that customers know where to find them) and they
are open on a regular schedule (so that customers know when to go there).
To operate in any other manner would so seriously disrupt their business
that they would scarcely be able to function or realize a reasonable profit.
Obviously, a retail vice establishment, operating in a permanent location,
and open regular hours, in counties with small populations and no urban
centers can scarcely evade the attention of political officials and law
enforcement officers. Therefore, some kind of accommodation is vital.
In addition, gambling, bootlegging and prostitution, because they are
volume businesses, draw considerable patronage from the residents of the
counties in which they operate. While there exists no reliable data upon
which to base an estimate, experience would seem to tell us that a minimum
of 25% and quite probably considerably more people in dry counties
patronize illegal liquor establishments (Davis and Potter, 1992). Obser-
vational research would also lend the impression that an even higher
number of county residents gamble. With so many people knowing of these
businesses it is similarly inconceivable that authorities do not share that
knowledge.
Drug trafficking, auto theft and weapons sales operate in a different
manner. First of all, volume is not required in these enterprises. A single
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purchase may bring with it a considerable profit. Marijuana cultivators sell
in quantity. They make as few as a half-dozen actual sales a year.
Obviously, chop shops have no need to deal in volume. Selling two or three
hot cars, or a quantity of parts does not require daily transactions. In
addition, these enterprises have no need for regular hours or permanent
locations. While a customer no doubt knows where he or she might find
his drug dealer and when that contact is most likely to be made, contacts
remain serendipitous rather than scheduled. Contact may be made by
phone or in person and most often the transaction is future oriented, with
the buyer and seller agreeing to meet to consummate the sale at a later time.
Drug dealers, auto thieves, and dealers in illicit weapons do not need to be
open for business from 8 p.m. to 2 a.m. Thursday through Saturday at a
permanent place of business to conduct their commercial activities. So,
while official corruption may be convenient and may make life much
easier, it is not as essential to these enterprises as they are to bootlegging,
gambling, and prostitution.
The mode of corruption utilized by rural crime networks is affected by
the type of criminal activity the network engages in as a primary source of
income. Six of the nine networks engaged in bootlegging are beneficiaries
of anonenforcementpolicy (four asaresultof familial relations). Similarly,
six of the nine gambling networks were able to utilize nonenforcement as
a primary mode of corruption. The ability of gambling and bootlegging
networks to rely on nonenforcement, as opposed to outright bribery or
active criminal participation by officials, no doubt reflects some political
and social truths about the &dquo;crimes&dquo; of drinking and gambling. While these
activities are illegal they are also pervasive. This creates an opportunity
for a policy of nonenforcement in that it is unlikely that a great deal of public
pressure will be applied for the enforcement of the laws. In addition, the
active enforcement of the laws creates some serious political dangers.
These counties are small, a few hundred votes can easily swing an election.
The arrest of a bootlegger or a gambler has the potential to result in a
considerable block of votes against an office-holder. The extended family
of the arrestee may control a hundred votes or so itself. Add to this the many
customers that have been inconvenienced or annoyed by the arrest and the
potential for major political trouble at the polls becomes quite real. A
policy of nonenforcement walks a thin line between angering potential
voters and engaging in blatant corruption.
The other criminal activities engaged in by crime networks pose more
of a problem for officials and the mode of corruption tends to be more
blatant. For example, only half of the prostitution networks can rely on a
nonenforcement policy and that nonenforcement policy is almost always
tied to prostitution conducted in roadhouses and jenny barns, retail outlets
for gambling and bootlegging. In those cases where prostitution activities
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stand on their own, outright bribery or active participation in the crime
network by officials is far more likely. With regard to drug trafficking, an
even more delicate balance must be struck. In the case of marijuana
cultivating and processing in some eastern Kentucky counties, there is
considerable social support for a nonenforcement policy (Kelley, 1989).
Reports of local resentment directed toward marijuana eradication cam-
paigns by the Kentucky State Police are common. In one case, a police
officer had to move out of his home county because of local hostility toward
anti-marijuana efforts. In other cases, police officers have reported that
local stores have refused to sell them food, beverages and gasoline during
anti-marijuana campaigns. Marijuana is seen as an important cash crop in
impoverished rural areas of eastern Kentucky. It not only supplies income
to a large number of residents, but it also results in significant infusions of
cash into local businesses and commerce. The other major drug-related
industry in eastern Kentucky is the transshipment of cocaine. Because
cocaine does notplay as significant a role as marijuana in the local economy
and because cocaine has a higher level of social disapproval attendant to
it, cocaine-related corruption tends to operate from a more direct mode,
principally involving bribery or active participation by officials in cocaine
transshipment networks.
Table 6:
Relationships Between the Number of Legitimate
Businesses Utilized by Rural Crime Networks
and the Use of Official Corruption by that Network
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Most rural organized crime networks do not make use of legitimate
businesses in the conduct of their criminal activities. There appears to be
a slight relationship between the propensity of a rural organized crime
network to use legitimate businesses as part of their criminal enterprises and
their use of official corruption. This relationship no doubt reflects three
basic characteristics of these crime networks. First, the networks which use
legitimate business fronts, either for money laundering purposes or directly
in the conduct of their illicit business, are obviously among the more
sophisticated of the crime networks. If they have gone to the trouble of
establishing complex business links to protect their activities, it is logical
that they would also make use of the protection afforded them by oppor-
tunities in the marketplace for corrupt services as well. Second, as was
discussed above, the incidence of corrupt relationships is higher among
those crime networks engaged in bootlegging, gambling and prostitution.
These are also the types of criminal enterprise most amenable to the use of
businesses as part of their criminal activities. Retail stores, service stations,
restaurants, truck stops, tanning salons, and game rooms are all otherwise
legitimate businesses used by vice purveyors for these illicit business
activities. Therefore, we would expect both the incidence of corruption and
the incidence of business infiltration to be higher among such crime
networks. Finally, crime networks dealing in drugs, while still showing a
high incidence of corruption, are less likely than other crime networks to
make use of corrupt services. They are also less likely to make use of
legitimate business fronts. This seems to contradict the highly held view
of drug trafficking as being dependent upon businesses to launder money.
This would no doubt be true for urban crime networks. But in rural eastern
Kentucky, drug traffickers do not have the same problems with cleaning
their ill-gotten gains. To a large extent, these counties operate on a cash
economy basis (Weller, 1965). Credit cards, loans, even bank accounts are
less common than in more urban settings. Major purchases such as
appliances, cars, and the like are often made with cash, not credit.
Therefore, no paper trail exists. Marijuana cultivators will often take their
cash yield and simply convert it to needed purchases. A dozen or so
individuals in a crime network purchasing trucks, cars and major appliances
can dispose of a great deal of cash in a hurry.
Corruption and the Organizing of Rural Crime
It is basic to the definition of organized crime that illicit goods and
services are delivered to the public on a continual and uninterrupted basis.
It does not require great insight to understand that this requires accommo-
dation with those social institutions whose purpose is to prevent the delivery
of those illicit goods and services. Every empirical study of organized crime
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published in the past two decades has stressed the importance of this
relationship, arguing that organized crime simply could not exist without
political and law enforcement corruption (Harring, 1983; Haller, 1972;
Albini, 1971; Dorsett, 1968; Bayor, 1978; Chambliss, 1978; Gardiner,
1970; Potter and Jenkins, 1985). The data in this study confirms that. It is
inconceivable that in these rural counties illicit gambling, prostitution,
alcohol, and drugs could be delivered on a regular and continual basis
without the knowledge of government officials, law enforcers, and
&dquo;legitimate&dquo; businessmen in the community. But the question remains, why
do &dquo;respectable&dquo; citizens in positions of public trust tolerate this type of
activity and even cooperate with it? The data strongly suggests that these
corrupt relationships are far more complex than simple bribes and other
venal considerations. In fact the data suggests that corruption may be quite
functional, not just for organized crime, which finds it necessary, but also
for the institutions of social control themselves. The data suggests that
official corruption not only exists, but is unavoidable for two primary
reasons. First, the laws which govern the delivery of illicit goods and
services are virtually unenforceable, and create serious political contradic-
tions in the community, contradictions which criminal organizations help
to resolve. Nad, second, the organizational structure of law enforcement,
particularly in rural counties, makes effective law enforcement impossible,
and makes attempts at effective law enforcement dysfunctional.
The laws which proscribe those goods and services provided by criminal
networks encourage corruption. The fact is that selective enforcement of
these laws is inevitable (Schur, 1965). Due to cooperation between
consumer and supplier, those involved in drugs, gambling, liquor, and
prostitution transactions do not perceive themselves as victims and conse-
quently are highly unlikely to initiate a complaint. In the absence of a
complaintant or victim, law enforcement officials are faced with a difficult t
problem in successfully uncovering offenders (McCaghy and Cemkovich,
1987). In those few cases that enforcement does occur, its selective nature
invariably serves to strengthen organized crime groups at the expense of
less organized entrepreneurs (McCaghy and Cemkovich, 1987).
On the other side of this arrangement, selective enforcement serves a
vital control function. The reduction of competition by the criminal justice
system limits organizational strain and reduces the potential for violence,
thereby facilitating law and order in the community. In the rural counties
of eastern Kentucky, where the drug trade has grown so quickly and become
so important, selective enforcement allows those charged with social
control functions to select allies in the underworld who in turn fashion and
enforce a set of norms in the illicit market which serve to enhance social
control. The &dquo;Cornbread Mafia,&dquo; arguably Kentucky’s largest marijuana
producing syndicate, is a prime example of a syndicate assisting in the
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maintenance of order. The &dquo;Combread Mafia&dquo;, quite literally, passes out
mimeographed sets of instructions for its minions in the marijuana trade.
These instructions range from controls on cultivation and processing, to
controls on prices, means of transport and proper security. In so doing, the
&dquo;Combread Mafia&dquo; has provided structure and stability in a highly volatile
market. In return, for many years, prior to federal intervention, the
&dquo;Combread Mafia&dquo; was left alone by local law enforcement. In those few
instances where arrests did occur, usually because of serendipitous activity
by the state police, the charges were dismissed in county courts.
An equally important consideration is that such an accommodation
serves to reduce tensions emanating from the laws themselves. Law
enforcement agencies are confronted with the enforcement of morality
legislation on which differential consensus levels exist. Groups offended
by these behaviors often engage in moral entrepreneurship (Gusfield,
1963). These groups are assisted by law enforcement agencies pursuing
their own organizational agenda, specifically desires for greater enforce-
ment powers, additional personnel and supplemental funding. Likewise,
criminalization efforts are often supported by community elites seeking an
expansion of their base of support. As these groups converge, a powerful
impetus is created resulting in legal proscription against certain behaviors.
However, this process creates social contradictions. Since the powerful
community forces, who assisted in the criminalization processes, often are
involved in illegal activities and, more importantly, profit directly or
indirectly from illicit activities, there is pressure placed upon law enforce-
ment to permit them to occur. Once again, the marijuana industry in eastern
Kentucky serves as a perfect example. Even those community members
who do not participate directly in marijuana cultivating and processing
benefit from the influx of capital into the community. Disposable income
is produced and spent locally. Shopkeepers and merchants are the indirect
beneficiaries of organized crime, and while they may deplore drug traffick-
ing, they are less sanguine about giving up the business which accompanies
it. Hills (1969) argues that &dquo;tolerance policies&dquo; are adopted as an effort to
accommodate these competing interests. Community members choosing
to participate in certain illegal activities do so under restricted conditions.
Those who are offended by these behaviors are given the impression that
the law is being enforced, albeit selectively.
Law enforcement agencies are often faced with organizational condi-
tions and constraints that make the enforcement of laws against organized
crime networks difficult or impractical. As we have seen, twenty-five of
the twenty-eight criminal networks operating in the area under study have
ongoing relationships with elected political office-holders and law enforce-
ment officials in their home counties. This fact alone places considerable
strain on the ability of local enforcement agents to control these groups.
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Elected officials not only exercise considerable political influence but also
control the purse strings for local sheriffs and police departments. They are
clearly in a position to influence what types of enforcement activity will
occur and the success of those activities. If elected officials decide that
it is not a major priority in their county to fund programs designed to control
marijuana cultivation, they have only to withhold funds for such projects.
If those officials decide that the sheriff’s department makes a greater
contribution to public safety by enforcing traffic laws, patrolling county
highways, and answering complaints, then it is likely that proactive
enforcement efforts against bootleggers, gamblers and prostitutes will have
a very low priority. If elected officials decide that pursuing vice purveyors
carries with it a distinct political liability they are likely to recommend that
the sheriff and local police collect taxes and respond to complaints.
In addition, these counties are poor. They are barely able to fund public
education, let alone aggressive law enforcement campaigns against vice.
Local sheriffs mustcollect taxes, undertake patrol services, provide staffing
for the courts, transport prisoners and respond to calls for service. They
must do this within the parameters of very tightly constrained budgets. In
fact, up until a few years ago many of these sheriffs found that the only way
they could run their offices was on a fee system where they actually charged
for services rendered. This fact, combined with the fact that investigating
the delivery of illicit goods and services is an expensive proposition, makes
a tolerance policy most attractive for most rural law enforcement agencies.
These small police departments and sheriffs offices cannot afford under-
cover investigations, stings, or the use of electronic surveillance devices.
They cannot afford the aircraft and equipment needed to find marijuana
plots. Therefore a policy which allows a certain amount of vice activity,
or tolerates that activity until there is a complaint upon which to base a
prosecution becomes almost a fiscal necessity.
Finally, there is some community pressure to continue a tolerance
policy. Alcohol is a prime case. A majority of the community may well
favor &dquo;dry&dquo; laws. But that does not mean that a significant portion of the
community does not desire a drink now and again. Bootlegging involves
the transporation and distribution of a bulky commodity, not easily con-
cealed. Therefore, in most places illegal liquor sales are easy to detect,
conducted more or less in the open, operated during regular hours and in
permanent locations. Law enforcement entities know about most bootleg-
gers, certainly the largest of them are well known. But there is a political
danger in pursuing them. Unless there is a complaint about traffic
problems, drunks, or a complaint from a dedicated &dquo;dry,&dquo; there is little
percentage in pursuing an investigation and arrest. Gambling represents a
similar scenario. While gambling may be illegal, it is not always illegal in
Kentucky. Support and official encouragement of wagering on thorough-
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breds is an important source of tax revenue, jobs, and income in Kentucky.
The distinction between betting at the track and off the track is often hard
to understand. Similarly the distinction between betting on a horse and a
roll of the dice or a turn of the card is seen as semantic. Many people gamble.
Few people are likely to complain. The political cost of enforcement often
exceeds the benefits.
Finally, some government and law enforcement officials often benefit
directly from the presence of organized crime networks. High demands for
illicit services generate huge profits sufficient to offer substantial induce-
ments capable of encouraging nonenforcement of these laws. Some com-
munity members benefit directly in the form of campaign funds, investment
opportunities, assistance in negotiations relative to public service, etc. In
fact, several studies of organized crime show that the organizers of crime
are indeed those who occupy positions of public trust (Gardiner, 1970;
Chambliss, 1978; Potter and Jenkins, 1985; Gardiner and Lyman, 1978;
Lupsha, 1987). Forming a cabal, they seek office for the opportunities that
arise from collaboration with the underworld.
To argue, as most traditional accounts of organized crime have, that it
cannot exist long without corrupting trusted officials is to tell only half the
story. Many social contradictions are resolved by, and many &dquo;legitimate&dquo;
social functions are in fact sustained by, organized crime groups. Organized
criminals and public officials form a close, symbiotic bond that usually
places the latter in the center of the illicit enterprise. Public officials are not
just the minions of organized crime; they are part of its fabric, albeit the part
found in society’s legitimate and respected institutions.
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